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Combatting Cyber-Attacks Through 
National Interest Diplomacy: A 
Trilateral Treaty with Teeth 
Lawrence L. Muir, Jr. 
Abstract 
In May 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicted 
five Chinese nationals for cybercrimes against American 
companies. That indictment was an impotent response. The 
United States has no extradition treaty with China, and the 
defendants will in all likelihood never be tried in the United 
States. The inefficacy of the indictments highlights a larger 
problem: State-controlled cyberunits can act with impunity under 
the present mix of international and domestic law. No laws govern 
conduct between nation-states, and, thus, neither victims nor 
nation-states have recourse against violators. 
This Article suggests that the United States should pursue 
national interest diplomacy to triangulate Russia and China by 
negotiating a trilateral cyberlaw treaty. The Article first 
demonstrates why the United States has failed in bilateral 
negotiations with these two nations in the past. It proposes that 
the United States should shift strategies by beginning to pursue 
national interest diplomacy rather than multilateral diplomacy. 
This strategy would encourage rapprochement with Russia first, 
thereby putting pressure on China to join the treaty or else be 
isolated. Finally, the Article lays out a workable framework on 
which policymakers can construct the diplomatic means to secure 
restitution for the victims of cyber-attacks. 
  
                                                                                                     
  Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. 
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I. Introduction 
On May 1, 2014, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, handed down a thirty-one count indictment1 
against five Chinese military officers alleging that they intruded 
into six organizations’ networks, including five multinational 
corporations.2 The primary purpose of these intrusions was to 
gain relative economic strength against the United States by 
stealing trade secrets and engaging in economic espionage to 
benefit the Chinese government.3 The Chinese conducted these 
cyber-attacks as part of an effort to fight U.S. steel tariffs that 
targeted Chinese exports.4 The United States does not have an 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong, Criminal No. 14-118 
(W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014) (indicting Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang 
Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui for conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse, 
computer fraud and abuse, damaging a computer, aggravated identity theft, 
economic espionage, and theft of trade secrets). 
 2. See Devlin Barrett & Siobahn Gorman, U.S. Charges Five in Chinese 
Army with Hacking, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304422704579571604060
696532 (last visited July 29, 2014) (describing the allegations contained in the 
United States’ indictment against Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, 
Huang Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 3. See John W. Miller, Pittsburgh-Area Firms Allegedly Targeted by 
Hacking, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 
10001424052702304422704579572273980220140 (last visited July 29, 2014) 
(discussing Chinese cyber-attacks on the United Steelworkers union, Alcoa, Inc., 
Westinghouse Electric Co., and Allegheny Technologies, Inc. in which the 
“conspirators stole trade secrets that would have been particularly beneficial to 
Chinese companies at the time”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 4. See id. (discussing how U.S. steel tariffs imposed in 2001 have resulted 
in American steelmakers filing seven complaints against China for trade 
violations). 
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extradition treaty with China, rendering the probability the 
People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) officers will ever be tried by a 
federal court virtually nil.5  
The incidents detailed in the indictment against these PLA 
officials were not the first acts of Chinese espionage directed 
against American corporations or the U.S. government. Prior to 
the indictment, American cybersecurity firm Mandiant issued a 
report detailing the existence of a special advanced persistent 
threat6 unit of the PLA, called Unit 61398, dedicated to the 
computer network infiltration of the corporations of English-
speaking nations.7 The Chinese were suspected in other cyber-
attacks against American corporations even before Mandiant 
published its report.8 For example, a set of high-profile cyber-
attacks on large companies in 2009, dubbed Operation Aurora, 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Barrett & Gorman, supra note 2 (noting that it is “unlikely [that] 
the suspects will ever be brought to trial in the U.S., [because] there is no 
extradition treaty with China”). 
 6. An advanced persistent threat is: 
[A] network attack in which an unauthorized person gains access to a 
network and stays there undetected for a long period of time. The 
intention of an APT attack is to steal data rather than to cause 
damage to the network or organization. APT attacks target 
organizations in sectors with high-value information, such as national 
defense, manufacturing and the financial industry. 
Margaret Rouse, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), SEARCHSECURITY, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/advanced-persistent-threat-APT 
(last visited July 30, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Advanced Persistent Threats: How They Work, SYMANTEC CORP., 
http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeid=apt-infographic-1 (last visited 
July 30, 2014) (providing that an advanced persistent threat “uses multiple 
phases to break into a network, avoid detection, and harvest valuable 
information over the long term”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 7. See MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE 
UNITS 3, 9, 20–26 (2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_ 
APT1_Report.pdf (discussing the existence and operations of China’s specialized 
cyber-attack military unit called PLA Unit 61398). 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew J. Schwartz, Google Aurora Hack Was Chinese 
Counterespionage Operation, INFO. WK. (May 21, 2013), http://www. 
darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/google-aurora-hack-was-chinese-count 
erespionage-operation/d/d-id/1110060? (last visited July 29, 2014) (discussing a 
set of cyber-attacks conducted by the Chinese government on at least thirty-four 
American companies in 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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included attacks on Google to obtain Google’s source code for its 
web search engine, information from private Gmail accounts, and 
information on undercover Chinese operatives contained in 
Google’s law enforcement portal.9 China was also suspected of 
engineering the malware that led to the theft of the security 
algorithm of RSA security tokens,10 which eventually led to the 
hacking of Lockheed Martin and the theft of the plans for the 
U.S. military’s F-35 fighter jet.11 Akamai Technology published 
its State of the Internet report in which it found that 
approximately 41% of all cyber-attacks originated from China.12 
China is not the only nation working against the United 
States’ economic, military, and diplomatic interests. The 
Department of Justice is likely preparing an indictment against 
Russians for similar activity.13 On June 30, 2014, the Financial 
Times reported that a Russian-linked hacking group entered the 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. (explaining that the cyber-attack on Google stole information 
that “would have given attackers insight into active investigations being 
conducted by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies that involved 
undercover Chinese operatives”). 
 10. An RSA token is either hardware or software “which is assigned to a 
computer user and which generates an authentication code at fixed intervals” to 
allow a user to join a secured network or access a secured network resource. 
SecurID, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SecurID (last visited July 30, 
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR 
(September 2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/chinese-
hacking-201109 (last visited July 29, 2014) (discussing various Chinese cyber-
attacks on American companies, including those on RSA, and the United States’ 
responses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The stolen 
information included plans for the fifth-generation fighter jet F-35, which has a 
remarkably similar Chinese counterpart: the J-20. See Ami Rojkes Dombe, 
Lockheed Martin’s Secrets in China’s New Stealth Fighter, ISRAEL DEF. (Mar. 16, 
2014), http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=472&ArticleID=2811 (last 
visited July 29, 2014) (discussing the cyber-attacks conducted on Lockheed 
Martin and the similarities between the United States’ and China’s latest 
stealth fighter jets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. See 7 AKAMAI’S STATE OF THE INTERNET 1, 4 (2014), 
http://www.akamai.com/dl/akamai/akamai-soti-q114.pdf?WT.mc_id=soti_Q114 
(providing statistics on the geographical origin of cyber-attacks by country for 
those countries with the highest origination traffic). 
 13. See Barrett & Gorman, supra note 2 (noting that “alleged hackers in 
Russia are likely to be charged soon” and that “U.S. agencies have also been 
investigating incidents with possible ties to Iran and Syria”). 
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“industrial control systems of hundreds of European and 
[American] energy companies” and infected them with malware 
called “Energetic Bear.”14 The malware “allows its operators to 
monitor energy consumption in real time,” indicating that 
Energetic Bear is primarily a tool for economic espionage.15 The 
malware could, however, be repurposed to provide remote control 
over infected systems or to physically cripple them.16 Speculation 
is that the hackers were working for the Federal Agency of 
Government Communications and Information (FAPSI)—the 
Russian equivalent of the NSA—but were not agents of the 
Russian military.17 
The Russian military has units with cyber capabilities, like 
PLA 61398.18 While PLA 61398 has engaged primarily in 
economic missions, the Russian units have stayed closer to a 
military mission. Prior to the Russian invasion of the nation of 
Georgia, the Russian military conducted cyber-warfare operations 
aimed at the Georgian government.19 The Russians have more 
                                                                                                     
 14. See Sam Jones, Energy Companies Hit By Cyber Attack from Russia-
Linked Group, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/606b97b4-
0057-11e4-8aaf-00144feab7de.html#axzz38shTkXxk (last visited July 29, 2014) 
(discussing a cyber-attack on the “industrial control systems of hundreds of 
European and US energy companies” conducted by “a state-backed group with 
apparent ties to Russia”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (noting that Energetic Bear could be used to “cripple physical 
systems such as wind turbines, gas pipelines and power plants at will” and 
comparing it to “the Stuxnet compute program created by the US and Israel 
that succeeded in infecting and sabotaging Iran’s uranium enrichment 
facilities”). 
 17. See id. (discussing “a former MI6 and military intelligence officer and 
founder of KCS Group[’s]” opinion that the perpetrators were “working with 
F[APSI] . . . ; working to support mother Russia”). 
 18. See Russia Announces Development of Cyber Military Unit, TRIPWIRE 
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/top-security-
stories/russia-announces-development-cyberwar-military-unit/ (last visited Aug. 
4, 2014) (providing that “Russian government officials . . . announced [that] they 
intended to create a designated military unit devoted to preventing cyber-based 
attacks from disrupting vital systems devoted to Russian military operations”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Russia’s newest cyber unit 
appears to be defensive in nature, however. See id. (noting that the Russian 
cyber unit “is intended to defend Russian armed forces’ critical infrastructure 
from computer attacks” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 19. See John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
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recently complemented military action with cyber-attacks in 
activities connected to the Crimean secession from Ukraine and 
realignment with Russia.20  
Foreign cyber-attacks have jeopardized the United States’ 
iron grip on its standing as the world’s foremost economic and 
military power. Token gestures, like the empty indictments of 
foreign nationals who will likely never have to account for their 
actions, underscore the impotence of the United States’ reaction 
to Chinese cyber-espionage and Russian cyber-enhanced 
adventurism. This article suggests a course of action that will 
enable the United States to pursue its national interest in 
combatting foreign cyber-attacks by effectively imposing law and 
order upon itself, China, and Russia. The United States should 
enter into negotiations with China and Russia to form a trilateral 
treaty (hereinafter referred to as the “Cyber Treaty”) establishing 
the rights and responsibilities of each nation when conducting 
cyber operations against one another.  
This Article predicts that this triangulation will benefit the 
United States in the cyber realm in much the same way that 
President Richard Nixon’s opening of China forced the Soviet 
Union to improve relations with the United States, thereby 
hastening the end of the Cold War. It begins by providing a 
condensed background on the raison d’état school of international 
relations, an overview of Cold War triangulation between these 
three nations, and a brief explanation of Sino-Russian relations 
                                                                                                     
12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?_r=0 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (discussing Russian cyber-attacks directed at 
Georgia prior to the Russian invasion, including distribution denial-of-service 
attacks that “effectively shut down Georgian servers”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See Mark Clayton, Massive Cyberattacks Slam Official Sites in Russia, 
Ukraine. CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www. 
csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Cyber-Conflict-
Monitor/2014/0318/Massive-cyberattacks-slam-official-sites-in-Russia-Ukraine 
(last visited July 29, 2014) (describing a “back-and-forth volley of cyberattacks 
that began last week between Ukraine and Russia”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). On the day of the Crimean referendum to 
secede from Ukraine, forty-two cyber-attacks hit Ukrainian government 
websites. See id. (noting that “Ukrainian government websites were hit by a 
wave of 42 cyberattacks during Crimea’s vote to secede from Ukraine and join 
Russia”). 
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to provide context for why triangulation will work in this updated 
cyber context. This Article then shifts focus from why 
triangulation will be effective to how the Cyber Treaty must look 
to be effective. It provides a framework that establishes a three-
judge tribunal, specific extradition between the nations, and a set 
of substantive and procedural laws that define what can and 
cannot be done, by what actors, and against which targets. This 
Article demonstrates why the proposed Cyber Treaty is the most 
effective way to protect American corporate and national 
interests, safeguard civilian populations, and encourage 
governmental oversight of cyber-activities. Because historically, 
and today, Russia and China have much more to fear from each 
other than the United States,21 this Cyber Treaty can pull each 
nation closer to the United States to effect the United States’  
national interest in restricting cyber-operations aimed at 
weakening the U.S. government and the businesses that give the 
United States its economic strength. 
II. Foreign Policy Underlying the Cyber Treaty 
A. The Cost of Cybercrime to the United States and Its Lack of 
Options to Act 
The cost of cybercrime to the United States is staggering. 
Cybercrime causes financial losses to businesses and reduced 
economic growth for the nation, which in turn results in 
decreased employment figures. A recent McAfee report 
approximated that economic losses from cybercrime “could cost as 
many as 200,000 American jobs.”22 The labor force participation 
rate in the United States for 2013 was 63.2%, a thirty-five year 
                                                                                                     
 21. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 729 (1994) (describing President 
Nixon’s diplomacy with China as being based on the idea that “America’s 
bargaining position would be strongest when America was closer to both 
communist giants than either was to the other”).  
 22. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE 
GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME II 3 (2014) 
[hereinafter MCAFEE REPORT], http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-
economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf. 
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low.23 McAfee’s estimate of job loss to cybercrime would add over 
a full tenth of a percentage to labor force participation. 
Cybercrime targets intellectual property, the research and 
development upon which future economic growth relies. McAfee 
estimates that cybercrime creates a 0.8% drag on global gross 
domestic product (GDP).24 The U.S. Department of Commerce 
estimated the loss of intellectual property to American companies 
due to cybercrime to be a minimum of $200 billion annually.25 
That figure was not translated into a percentage drag on U.S. 
GDP, though the loss certainly retards economic growth. 
It is clearly in the best interest of the United States, 
American businesses, and American workers to reduce the losses 
caused by cybercrime and cyber-espionage. What is less clear, 
and certainly has not been determined, is the most effective way 
to bring about this reduction. The traditional manner of handling 
criminal activity, trial and punishment,26 is not fully effective in 
this context because the United States does not have extradition 
treaties with Russia or China, and therefore cannot enforce 
violations of American domestic law.27 If domestic laws are 
unenforceable, then the United States must seek recourse 
through international law.  
The only operative cybercrime convention—the European 
Union Convention on Cybercrime—has been signed and ratified 
by the United States, even though it is a non-member of the 
Council of Europe. China has not signed the convention; nor has 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Ali Meyer, Labor Force Participation in 2013 Lowest in 35 Years, 
CSNNEWS.COM (March 3, 2014), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/ali-meyer/labor-
force-participation-2013-lowest-35-years (last visited July 29, 2014) (noting that 
the “average annual labor force participation rate hit a 35-year-low of 63.2 
percent in the United States in 2013, according to data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. MCAFEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 11. 
 25. See id. at 12 (noting that the Department of Commerce report found 
that “IP theft (all kinds, not just cybercrime) costs US companies $200 to $250 
billion annually”).  
 26. For example, restitution, fines, or imprisonment. 
 27. See List of United States Extradition Treaties, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_extradition_treaties (last 
visited July 29, 2014) (showing that the United States does not currently have 
an extradition treaty with China or Russia) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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Russia, despite being a member of the Council. The United 
States, therefore, has no recourse in domestic or international 
law to enforce cybercrime laws. To achieve the United States’ goal 
of reducing cybercrime to enhance domestic economic growth, this 
lack of recourse must be remedied through precise diplomatic 
means. 
1. Historic and Current Bilateral Diplomatic Failures Involving 
China and Russia 
In the bipolar world between the start of the Cold War and 
the opening of China, relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union were marked by a lack of discernible progress 
for the United States. The Soviet sphere of influence spread into 
Eastern Europe with little American opposition;28 a diplomatic 
stalemate for the United States at best. The Historian of the 
State Department described President Kennedy’s foreign policy 
with the Soviets, which continued through President Johnson’s 
administration, as “marred by a string of failures.”29 While the 
United States diplomatic failures with the Soviets allowed the 
Soviet Union to dictate terms, the United States diplomatic 
posture towards China was non-recognition of the government 
and blockage of China’s joining the United Nations until 1971.30 
                                                                                                     
 28. The Soviets toppled a freely elected non-Communist government in 
Hungary, and invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. See generally The 1956 
Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/ (last visited Aug. 11, 
2014) (discussing how the Soviet Union crushed the Hungarian Revolution of 
1956) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Soviet Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, 1968, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/soviet-invasion-czechoslavkia 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2014) (discussing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. A Short History of the Dep’t of State, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/jfk-
foreignpolicy (last visited July 29, 2014) (describing American foreign policy 
defeats to the Soviet Union over the Berlin Wall and at the Vienna Summit) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See China and the United Nations, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_and_the_United_Nations (last visited July 
29, 2014) (discussing the history of China’s admittance to the U.N. Security 
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Both nations, individually, were enemies of the United States. 
The United States’ performance with these two nations in 
bilateral negotiations has not fared better in the last forty years. 
The next section addresses very recent diplomatic American 
diplomatic failures. 
a. Bilateral Failures with China: Failing to Understand China’s 
Pursuit of Its National Self-Interest. 
The United States has repeatedly sought cooperation directly 
from China on the issue of cybercrime, but each bilateral meeting 
has failed to produce any accords between the two nations.31 In 
June 2013, President Obama stated to Chinese President Xi 
Jinping that “he want[ed] a world where all countries play by the 
same rules on cybersecurity.”32 However, the fledgling 
cooperation between China and the United States on cybercrime 
has since ground to a halt.33  
Bilateral negotiation with China has not produced any 
meaningful progress for the United States.34 This lack of progress 
                                                                                                     
Council) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See Bradley Klapper & Louise Watt, U.S., China Talk Cyber Hacking 
Amid New Allegations, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/10/us-china-
cyberhacking_n_5574260.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing the 
“Strategic and Economic Dialogue” between the United States and China, in 
which the countries discussed cybercrime, but failed to come to a specific 
agreement on the issue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32. Rory Carroll, Barack Obama and Xi Jinping Meet as Cyber-Scandals 
Swirl, THE GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/08/obama-xi-jinping-meet-cyberscandals (last visited July 29, 2014) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See Alina Selyukh & Doina Chiacu, China Cyber Crime Cooperation 
Stalls After U.S. Hacking Charges, REUTERS (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/us-usa-cybersecurity-china-idUSKB 
N0F12OJ20140626 (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing how “cooperation has 
stopped” on combating cybercrime after the United States indicted Chinese 
officials for cyber-attacks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. On the cybercrime issue and others. A promising bilateral investment 
treaty from the 2013 talks was said to be “facing big difficulties.” See Kevin Yao 
& Nick Macfie, China Says Investment Talks with U.S. Facing Difficulties, 
REUTERS (July 10, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/us-china-
usa-talks-idUSKBN0FF17620140710 (last visited July 29, 2014) (providing that 
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is due to the President’s misunderstanding of Chinese foreign 
policy, as evidenced by his calling for a single set of rules followed 
by all nations. Chinese foreign policy reserves “deep 
skepticism . . . about the liberal premises and basic concept of 
global governance, seeing it as the latest ‘trap’ laid by the West 
(primarily the United States) to ‘bleed’ China by getting it 
involved in crises and places where it does not have a direct 
national interest.”35 To succeed in negotiations with China, the 
United States must avoid global, collective goals, and speak in 
terms of national interest; and China has a strong national 
interest in continuing its cybercrime spree against the United 
States.  
b. Bilateral Failures with Russia: Failing to Understand Russia’s 
Pursuit of Its National Self-Interest 
The United States is in even worse diplomatic straits with 
Russia. The United States has imposed sanctions against Russian 
businessmen in response to Russian action in the Ukraine.36 
Those sanctions have not been fully effective, as European 
sanctions have not dovetailed with the American sanctions, 
allowing a Russian end-run around the United States’ 
sanctions.37 Moreover, the United States has actually increased 
                                                                                                     
“[n]egotiations between China and the United States on a bilateral investment 
treaty [were] facing big difficulties”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 35. David Shambaugh, The Illusion of Chinese Power, THE NAT’L INTEREST 
(June 25, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-illusion-chinese-power-
10739?page=show (last visited July 29, 2014) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 36. See Julie Pace, U.S. Preparing Unilateral Sanctions on Russia, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 16, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/us-preparing-
unilateral-sanctions-russia-193329225--politics.html (last visited July 29, 2014) 
(discussing the United States’ imposition of economic sanctions against Russia 
in response to “its threatening moves in Ukraine”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See Carol Matlack, Russia Sanctions Lose Their Bite As U.S. and 
Europe Pull in Different Directions, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 2, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-02/russia-sanctions-lose-their-
bite-as-u-dot-s-dot-and-europe-pull-in-different-directions (last visited Aug. 5, 
2014) (explaining that Western sanctions against Russia have “caused no more 
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trade with Russia since the sanctions were imposed.38 Despite 
these ineffective sanctions—the diplomatic equivalent of an 
indictment that will go forever unserved—Russia’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, stated that “the United States 
had wrapped up all tried and effective forms of cooperation and 
dialogue with Russia.”39 He compared current United States 
policy to the containment principle at the outset of the Cold War, 
and then taunted that: “These are methods of the past, the very 
old past. If they are using these methods[,] their foreign policy 
arsenal must . . . not [be] very rich.”40 Minister Ryabkov 
ultimately threatened that Russia would deploy a new weapon as 
retaliation for the sanctions.41   
But, within Minister Ryabkov’s taunts lies the United States’ 
route toward successfully reducing adversarial cyber-activities. 
He stated: “In essence, they (the United States) reject the very 
possibility of us having any national interests. They reject the 
possibility of a model of values that is different from the one used 
by the [United States] and other Western countries.”42 If the 
United States is to make an effective effort against foreign cyber-
attacks, it must pivot toward a foreign policy based on pursuing 
its national interest and allow Russia and China to pursue their 
national interests as well.  
                                                                                                     
than moderate inconvenience to their targets” because sanctions “imposed by 
the U.S. and its European allies have been out of sync”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. See Kenneth Rapoza, U.S. Exports to Russia Rise Despite Tensions, 
Minor Sanctions, FORBES (July 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/kenrapoza/2014/07/04/u-s-exports-to-russia-rise-despite-tensions-minor-
sanctions/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (noting that the United States “exported 
more good[s] and services to Russia” in May 2014 than any other month of 2014 
despite sanctions “targeted towards a handful of Russian oligarchs”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. US Sanctions Are New Type of Offensive Weapon—Russia’s Deputy FM, 
RT (July 4, 2014), http://rt.com/politics/170424-us-sanctions-weapon-russia/ (last 
visited July 29, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. (explaining that Rayabkov “warned that Russia was preparing a 
response” to the United States’ sanctions, noting that “[t]here must be a 
defensive weapon for every offensive weapon” and that Russia is “working on it 
now”). 
 42. Id. 
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Minister Ryabkov’s allusion to containment policy (“the very 
old past”) begs comparison to a more recent and successful 
foreign policy strategy: that of triangulation. In the past, 
triangulation allowed the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China to pursue their own national interests. This strategy 
ultimately hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has the 
potential to assist the United States in challenging Chinese 
cyber-attacks. 
2. Triangulation Between the United States, China, and Russia 
Provides the United States with the Greatest Number of Options 
and Highest Probability of Success 
The concept of Cold War triangulation was first mentioned in 
the 1968 Republican presidential nomination contest. Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller had suggested that by forming “a subtle 
triangle of relations between [the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and China, the United States would] improve the 
possibilities of accommodations with each as [the United States] 
increas[ed its] options toward both.”43 Improving relations with 
China to achieve American interests adverse to the Soviet Union 
ultimately worked, hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union to 
end the Cold War. In a subtle reversal of influence, today the use 
of triangulation with Russia could exert influence upon China to 
modify its behavior and cool down the cyber-war. 
a. How Triangulation Ended the Cold War 
Prior to the exploration of diplomatic relations with China, 
the Soviet sphere of influence had expanded deep into Eastern 
Europe.44 The United States’ policy of containment, which 
effectively tried to stop Soviet expansion while awaiting the 
                                                                                                     
 43. KISSINGER, supra note 21, at 721. 
 44. The Soviets installed a Communist government in Hungary despite free 
election results that went against the Communists, and smashed the 
Czechoslovak uprising. See generally The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History 
in Documents, supra note 28 (discussing Soviet military intervention after the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956). 
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internal collapse of the Soviet Union, at best produced a 
geopolitical stalemate between the two nations.45 President 
Nixon’s administration sought to reverse this course.  
As Soviet influence spread west across Europe, the Soviet 
Union’s relationship with China began to deteriorate. In 1962, 
Chinese immigrants began moving into the Soviet Union.46 In 
1964, Chairman Mao Zedong stated, amidst the rising tensions, 
“that Tsarist Russia had stripped China of vast territories in 
Siberia.”47 In 1969, small-scale combat erupted between the two 
nations, with both sides suffering casualties.48 The Soviets had 
inadvertently opened a second front in the Cold War. 
The United States sensed an opportunity to weaken the 
Soviet Union by supporting China.49 The United States made 
unilateral advances toward China to signal to its erstwhile enemy 
that the United States would support its government. These 
minor gestures, such as allowing for small exports of goods,50 
opened the door to cooperation on major issues.51 
                                                                                                     
 45. See KISSINGER, supra note 21, at 482–90 (explaining that the 
application of containment theory in the Korean War resulted in a calculated 
stalemate because the United States miscalculated Soviet and Chinese power 
and resolve to support communist rule in Korea). 
 46. See Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Sino-Soviet_border_conflict (last visited July 29, 2014) (discussing how the 
Sino-Soviet border conflict began when ethnic Uyghur refugees crossed into 
Soviet territory and China accused the Soviets of subverting the Uyghur 
population) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. (discussing how Chinese troops “ambushed Soviet border guards 
on Zhenbao Island” on March 2, 1969). 
 49. See KISSINGER, supra note 21, at 722–23 (explaining that the United 
States aligned with China because it feared that the “application of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine to China would mean that Moscow would try to make the 
government in Beijing as submissive as Czechoslovakia’s had been obliged to 
become”). 
 50. See id. at 723 (noting that the “prohibition against Americans’ traveling 
to [China] was eliminated,” that “Americans were allowed to bring $100 worth 
of Chinese-made goods into the United States,” and that “limited American 
grain shipments were permitted to China”). 
 51. See id. (explaining that the United States’ minor gestures toward 
China, “though insignificant in themselves, were designed to convey America’s 
new approach”). 
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The United States believed that triangulation would be 
effective because so long as the Soviet Union and China had more 
to fear from each other than from the United States, both nations 
would seek to grow closer to the United States to gain an 
advantage over the other.52 To put it more constructively, both 
nations calculated that they either needed the United States’ 
goodwill or feared that the United States would move toward its 
adversary, thereby providing an incentive to improve relations 
with the United States.53 The Soviets acted on this incentive, 
leading to the eventual reforms sought by Mikhail Gorbachev and 
the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. Though the relative 
strength of China and Russia have since reversed, the United 
States remains the strongest party, and both nations are better 
off working with the United States than against it, which sets the 
stage for the Cyber Treaty. 
b. Why Triangulation Can Work to End the Cyber-War 
To negotiate a cyber treaty, each of the three nations must be 
convinced that the treaty is in its best national interest. This next 
section explores how each nation could benefit from entering into 
the Cyber Treaty. 
(1) Issues Between Russia and China 
Triangulation worked for the Nixon administration because 
China and Russia were heading toward a border war, and moving 
closer to the United States could provide a strategic advantage 
for each. The current context is a bit different for the United 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 730 (explaining that triangulation succeeded because it 
created an incentive for the Soviet Union “to moderate existing crises and to 
avoid stirring up new ones while faced with resistance” from NATO and China, 
and China needed the United States’ “goodwill in setting limits to Soviet 
adventurism”). 
 53. See id. at 725 (noting that the “ostentatious renunciation of collusion 
with either of the communist giants served as an invitation to each to improve 
relations with Washington, and as a warning to each of the consequences of 
continued hostility”). 
COMBATTING CYBER-ATTACKS 89 
States, as a Western-led push against Russia has in turn pushed 
Russia, which is economically heavily dependent upon energy 
exports,54 into a thirty-year energy deal with China worth 
approximately $400 billion.55 This deal secured China’s long-term 
energy needs to fuel future economic growth and further 
increases China’s influence over the Russian economy.56 Though 
at first blush this deal appears to undo the basis for successful 
triangulation, further analysis shows that this is a positive factor 
for the United States as it appears that the balance of power 
between Russia and China is tilting continuously toward China.57  
Russia and China have a long history of geopolitical tension. 
The Border Conflict of 1969 is replaying itself today. In June 
2010, China leased 426,600 hectares of Russian land to Chinese 
farmers.58 Russians have called Chinese immigration the 
“Chinese conquest of Siberia,”59 while China has historically 
claimed Siberia as its own.60 Siberia is rich in natural resources, 
such as copper and zinc. One scholar projects the Chinese 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Russia GDP Growth Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth (last visited Aug. 11, 2014) 
(“[The energy sector] contributes 20 [to] 25 percent of GDP, 65 percent of total 
exports and 30 percent of government budget revenue.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See Remi Piet, Russia-China Energy Deal: Geopolitical Tectonic Shift: 
Can an Emerging China-Russia Axis Challenge US Hegemony?, AL JAZEERA 
(June 17, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/russia-china-
energy-alliance-ge-201461765254926525.html (last visited July 29, 2014) 
(noting that Russia and China “agreed on an unprecedented 30-year energy 
agreement . . . firmly strengthen[ing] the strategic Russian-Chinese cooperation 
ties and guarantee[ing] a much needed source of income for an ailing Russian 
economy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56. See id. (explaining that the deal “secured essential natural gas supplies 
to fuel future Chinese economic growth and further increase[d] Beijing’s 
influence on the Russian economy”). 
 57. See id. (stating the details of the deal and illustrating the weakening 
Russian economic position and the shift of the balance of power toward China).  
 58. Richard Rousseau, Will China Colonize and Incorporate Siberia?, HARV. 
INT’L REV. (July 09, 2012), http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/2949 (last visited Aug. 
14, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the Sino-Russian 
border dispute over Siberia, which involved isolated military action in 1969). 
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encroachment into Siberia could push Russia into the arms of the 
West.61 
There is a cyber connection to this analysis. While the 
Russian economy has struggled,62 the Chinese economy grows.63 
Part of the engine driving Chinese economic growth is the theft of 
American intellectual property. While the United States spends 
2.9% of its GDP on research and development, China only spends 
1.7%.64 It stands to reason that some of the disparity is due to 
China’s theft of American research and development, obviating 
the need for greater investment. Thus, as China steals American 
intellectual property, China’s growth rate remains high, at the 
expense of the Russian balance of power with China. This puts 
Russia into a position where limiting China’s growth rate, 
particularly the rate driven by stolen intellectual property, 
benefits Russia’s national interest as well as the United States’ 
national interest.65 
(2) Why Should China Cooperate with the United States on Cyber-
Attacks? 
                                                                                                     
 61. Rousseau, supra note 58. 
 62. See China vs. Russia—Economy Comparison, INDEXMUNDI, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/china.russia/economy (last 
visited July 29, 2014) (noting that the Russian economy grew at an approximate 
rate of 3.4% in 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Russia 
is currently in a recession. See Piet, supra note 55 (noting that the “Russian 
economy [is] currently experiencing the first signs of a recession worsened by 
US and European sanctions”). 
 63. See China vs. Russia—Economy Comparison, supra note 62 (providing 
that the Chinese economy grew at an approximate rate of 7.8% in 2012). 
 64. See Shambaugh, supra note 35 (noting that “in 2009 China spent only 
1.7 percent of its GDP on research and development, compared with 2.9 percent 
in the United States”). 
 65. As a side note, China must maintain a 7% growth rate to maintain full 
employment. See Shambaugh, supra note 35 (noting that the Chinese 
“government is struggling to maintain the 7 percent annual growth rates 
deemed necessary to maintain reasonably full employment, absorb new entrants 
into the workforce and sustain social stability”). Thus, Russia preventing 
Chinese growth based on stolen IP would create internal problems in China, to 
its advantage. 
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The World Bank reports that 26% of China’s GDP comes 
from exports,66 and “[e]xport growth has been a major component 
supporting China’s rapid economic expansion.”67 The United 
States is China’s largest trading partner, receiving 17% of 
Chinese exports.68 Thus, the Chinese economy would be 
particularly sensitive to a trade war with the United States, and 
that is precisely what is developing. The cyber-attacks have 
contributed to the circumstances that are pushing the two 
countries towards the “brink of a trade war.”69  
In early June 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
imposed significant duties on Chinese solar products, such as 
solar panels.70 SolarWorld AG’s American subsidiaries were 
victims of the Chinese hacking that led to the Wang Dong 
indictment. The other victim companies in that indictment were 
Pittsburgh-based companies with connections to the steel 
industry. The PLA hacked into U.S. Steel to gain inside 
information about the trade dispute involving steel pipes and 
tubes.71 Since the start of 2013, U.S. steelmakers have filed seven 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS (last visited July 29, 
2014) (providing that exports of goods and services accounted for about 26% of 
China’s GDP in 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. China Exports, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ 
china/exports (last visited July 29, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 68. See id. (“China’s main export partners are the United States 
(17 percent), European Union (16 percent), ASEAN (10 percent),Japan 
(7 percent) and South Korea.”). 
 69. See Trish Regan, The NSA and Dangers of a Trade War with China, 
USA TODAY (June 8, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
business/2014/06/08/trish-regan-china-trade-war/10072969/ (last visited July 29, 
2014) (noting that the “United States may be on the brink of a trade war 
with . . . China” because of “cyberspying”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 70. See Everett Rosenfeld, Solar Shares Leap as US-China Trade War 
Escalates, CNBC (June 4, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101731790# (last 
visited July 29, 2014) (explaining that the “U.S. Commerce Department 
announced a new set of duties on Chinese solar products . . . , sending American 
solar stocks like First Solar and SunPower skyrocketing, and China-based Trina 
Solar and JinkoSolar falling”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 71. See id. (providing that the cyber-attacks on U.S. Steel “were designed to 
extract sensitive information from U.S. Steel employees during a trade dispute 
 
92 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2014) 
trade complaints against China, the most since tariffs were 
imposed in 2001.72 
For its part, China does not think that the United States is 
blameless. In retaliation for the indictment, China accused Cisco 
Systems of spying on behalf of the United States, “bann[ed] the 
use of Microsoft’s Windows 8 operating system,” and accused 
“Apple, Google, and Facebook [of] cooperat[ing] in a secret U.S. 
program to monitor China.”73 The destructive consequences of a 
trade war would be felt by companies on both sides, as Cisco 
earned 15% of its revenue in a nine-month period from Asia, 
including China, while Chinese competitors have eroded its 
business.74 This means that China’s accusation of Cisco spying 
may have less to do with accuracy and more to do with weakening 
an American competitor to bolster Chinese companies. 
Thus, the two nations stand at the precipice of a trade war, 
fueled by the winds of a cyber-war. The Cyber Treaty, between 
the United States, Russia, and China—three nations whose 
economies need to export to each other—may be the diplomatic 
option that cools down this cyber-war. In this way, a Cyber 
Treaty could avoid the destructive economic consequences of a 
trade war between these nations. The United States must revive 
its Cold War strategy of triangulation, and that strategy must 
result in a treaty that creates mutual responsibilities, cultivates 
trust, and provides punishment for violations of that trust. 
III. The Framework for the Cyber Treaty 
                                                                                                     
over imports of steel pipes and tubes for the U.S. oil and gas industry”). 
 72. See Miller, supra note 3 (noting that “U.S.-based steelmakers, led by 
U.S. Steel, have filed [forty] trade complaints with the U.S. government, 
including seven against China, the most intense period of trade litigation since 
2001”). 
 73. Regan, supra note 69. 
 74. See Austin Ramzy, China Pulls Cisco into Dispute on Cyberspying, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/business/ 
international/china-pulls-cisco-into-dispute-on-cyberspying.html (last visited 
July 29, 2014) (noting that “[a]bout 15 percent of Cisco’s revenue of $35.8 billion 
for the nine-month period ended in April came from Asia, including China,” and 
that “sales in China dropped 7 percent”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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A. Goals Underlying the Cyber Treaty 
To fulfill the United States’ national interests, the Cyber 
Treaty should accomplish the following goals: 1) reduce the theft 
of intellectual property from businesses; 2) hold violators of the 
Cyber Treaty responsible; 3) protect civilian populations from the 
results of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure; 4) prevent 
military units from engaging in cyber economic espionage on 
behalf of corporate entities; and 5) professionalize cyber-attacks 
by reducing the use of “paramilitary” hacker groups and other 
unaffiliated hackers. The terms of the Cyber Treaty should be 
written to support those goals by including mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the law and promoting cooperation between the 
nations.  
The next two subparts provide an overview of the Cyber 
Treaty’s framework. The first subpart provides for a tribunal to 
resolve disputes arising under the Cyber Treaty and details the 
organizational structure of the tribunal and its powers. The 
second subpart provides the substantive and procedural laws to 
guide the outcome of disputes and set the rules of the road for 
cyberspace conduct between these three nations vis-a-vis each 
other. 
B. The Cyber Treaty’s Framework: Enabling and Establishment 
Clauses 
The subject of the Cyber Treaty is an amalgamation of 
different types of legal issues. Cyber law is not so much a body of 
law, such as torts or criminal law, but rather is a thread that 
weaves its way through the traditional bodies of law in search of 
the closest analogies. Thus, when cyber-attacks operate as cyber-
warfare, the Cyber Treaty should look to guidance from the 
United Nations Charter provisions on kinetic warfare. When 
cyber-attacks operate as private cybercrime, the Cyber Treaty 
should borrow from American domestic criminal law and 
procedure, as well as look to the setup of the International Court 
of Justice and International Criminal Court for guidance. When 
cyber-attacks serve as cyber-espionage, particularly when the 
motive for the espionage is economic, the Cyber Treaty should 
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look to the dispute settlement process of the World Trade 
Organization.  
The Cyber Treaty must provide a structure that organizes 
the tribunal, defines standing for parties, establishes jurisdiction, 
and has procedural rules for the operation of the tribunal. The 
following proposals rely heavily on treaties with dispute-
resolution procedures, but are customized for the participation of 
only three nations, all of whom have demonstrated reluctance to 
concede sovereignty to international bodies. By borrowing from 
the most appropriate areas of extant multilateral organizations, 
familiarity with those processes will lead to a more effective 
treaty. The Cyber Treaty begins with establishing a tribunal to 
hear disputes. 
1. Conceptual Framework of the Tribunal 
Article 1 of the Cyber Treaty provides for the establishment 
of a tripartite tribunal with authority to resolve disputes and 
grievances arising under the treaty. Using common law 
distinctions, the tribunal should have civil law authority to hear 
disputes that are primarily economic in nature and also possess 
limited criminal jurisdiction. The criminal authority enables the 
court to act similarly to a magistrate court in the American 
federal judicial system, making probable cause determinations 
and extradition decisions.75 
a. Organization of the Tribunal 
The tribunal should consist of three judges. China, Russia, 
and the United States will each appoint one judge, qualified to 
practice law in his or her respective nation. The three judges form 
a panel, and the full panel should preside over each hearing. 
Though each judge is a national of a member party, the judges 
                                                                                                     
 75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2014) (providing magistrate judges with the 
authority to review extradition requests); Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 5.1 (providing 
the procedure for and requiring a preliminary—probable cause—hearing when a 
defendant is charged with a crime). 
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shall be required to act impartially and conscientiously.76 The 
court should not be seated in one fixed location, but rather should 
meet in the nation that is home to the aggrieved party.77 The 
aggrieved party shall be the plaintiff in a civil case or the 
defendant in a criminal case.78 The tribunal will decide cases 
based on a majority of votes.79 
b. Competence of the Court 
Competence of the court contemplates issues of jurisdiction, 
standing of the parties to participate, and applicable law. This 
Article recommends providing the court with both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, addressing each separately. 
(1) Who May Be a Party and How Matters are Referred 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) allow only member states to be parties to 
disputes before the court.80 The International Criminal Court 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 20, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter ICJ Statute], T.S. 993, 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (“Every 
member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, make a solemn 
declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and 
conscientiously.”). 
 77. See id. art. 22 (“The seat of the court shall be established at The Hague. 
This, however, shall not prevent the Court from sitting and exercising its 
functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable.”); Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, art. 3, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (fixing the seat of the court in the Hague, but 
allowing the court flexibility to determine appropriate seats when necessary). 
 78. See ICJ Statute, art. 34 (providing the court with jurisdiction to resolve 
disputes between states under international law); Rome Statute, art. 5 
(providing the court with jurisdiction over prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity). 
 79. See ICJ Statute, art. 55 (“All questions shall be decided by a majority of 
the judges present.”); Rome Statute, art. 54 (“The judges shall attempt to 
achieve unanimity in their decision, failing which the decision shall be taken by 
a majority of the judges.”). 
 80. See ICJ Statute, art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before 
the Court.”); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] 
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(ICC) exercises jurisdiction over individuals or groups that have 
been accused of crimes.81 The Cyber Treaty should provide the 
appropriate jurisdiction given the type of action before the 
tribunal and remedy sought by the aggrieved party. 
(a) Civil Matters 
In a civil case, only member parties may bring a complaint 
for a violation of the Cyber Treaty. Member parties may bring 
claims on behalf of the country, private parties, or both. 
Procedurally, when a company, public utility, or government 
agency has been the victim of a cyber-attack that can be 
attributed to a person or group within another signatory nation, 
the victim files a complaint with its national government. The 
national government will then formally file a complaint with the 
tribunal.82 The government of the member nation will then 
represent the party or parties at the tribunal.  
The rationale for this rule is judicial efficiency. Frequently 
cyber-attacks are bundled, and when one company or utility is a 
victim, other entities likely have been victimized in the same 
cyber-attack.83 The evidence that supports a charge in one cyber-
attack will frequently be the same evidence used to support 
allegations of another.84 Thus, judicial economy is best served by 
allowing the court to hear related complaints in one hearing with 
plaintiffs and defendants acting through one counsel. 
                                                                                                     
(providing the World Trade Organization’s dispute-resolution procedures only 
apply to member states). 
 81. See Rome Statute, art. 12–13 (providing jurisdiction over the 
prosecution of individuals for crimes committed in the territory of a signatory 
state or when the defendant is a national of a signatory state). 
 82. See ICJ Statute, art. 36(1) (providing jurisdiction through referral by 
the parties); Rome Statute, art. 14 (providing that a state party may refer a 
crime to the Prosecutor to request an investigation). 
 83. See, e.g., Barrett & Gorman, supra note 2 (noting that the Wang Dong 
indictment alleged that the defendants “hack[ed] into five U.S. companies and a 
labor union”). 
 84. See MANDIANT, supra note 7, at 41–50 (discussing how Mandiant traced 
cyber-attacks across countries and companies to various Internet Protocol 
addresses and then to servers at one origination point). 
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(b) Criminal Matters 
Neither the United States, Russia, nor China has shown a 
willingness to enter into multilateral treaties that would allow 
international tribunals to try their citizens on criminal charges. 
This Article seeks to provide a framework that will work in the 
real world, and therefore this Article does not recommend 
providing the tribunal with authority to try criminal offenses. 
However, the United States has taken the step of indicting five 
Chinese military officials, an empty gesture that underscores the 
need for extradition for cyber-attacks. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey 
stated upon the indictment of the PLA officers that: “This is 
thievery, so we’re going to investigate it and seek to prosecute it 
the way we do when anyone kicks in your door and steals 
something from your house or business.”85 Director Comey is 
right, but the nature of cyber offenses is that the thievery seldom 
requires a physical presence in the location of the purloined 
material, seldom requires physical transportation of the material, 
and frequently originates and is carried out in another nation. 
Thus, for the United States to act on Director Comey’s 
sentiments, the United States must find a way to gain 
jurisdiction over these cyber door-kickers. 
The Cyber Treaty contemplates providing an extradition 
forum for the limited number of cybercrimes that will be 
discussed below. As the United States does not have an 
extradition treaty with China or Russia, this very limited 
extradition would be an effective first step toward resolving the 
need to hold people responsible for the damage done by cyber-
attacks, balanced against the clear reluctance to allow any of the 
nations to try another nation’s citizens for crimes.  
Procedurally, if a country indicts a foreign national under 
any substantive criminal charge the Cyber Treaty specifically 
creates or incorporates, then the indicted defendants should be 
taken forthwith into custody by the national law enforcement 
agency of the host nation. Upon referral by the Attorney General 
                                                                                                     
 85. Barrett & Gorman, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(or equivalent) of any nation, and within a period of time to be 
determined, the panel should convene in a city in the nation 
where the defendant is being held. The three-judge panel should 
review the evidence against that person in an adversarial setting, 
and if a majority of the judges determine that the indictment is 
supported by probable cause, the defendant shall be extradited 
for trial in the charging nation. The hearing is designed to 
provide confidence in the validity of the charges. More 
importantly, the extradition provision forces all three nations into 
defining what conduct, committed by whom, is disallowed. The 
larger goal achieved by the extradition power is that the three 
nations must impose rules upon cyber-warfare, where none have 
previously existed. 
(2) Jurisdiction 
The tribunal should have jurisdiction in civil matters arising 
from violations of the substantive laws of the Cyber Treaty. In 
addition, the tribunal should have jurisdiction in criminal 
matters concerning violations of treaty provisions or violations of 
specific criminal provisions of the domestic laws of a nation that 
have been incorporated into the Cyber Treaty. 
(a) Civil Jurisdiction 
The primary basis for referred complaints falling under civil 
jurisdiction will concern the theft of intellectual property and 
research and development through cybercrime and cyber-
espionage. These complaints will be akin to complaints referred 
to the WTO. Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU), the basis or cause of action for a WTO dispute must be 
found in the “covered agreements” listed in Appendix 1 to the 
DSU.86 Put another way, it is not the DSU that gives rise to the 
action, but the WTO Agreements that give parties their 
                                                                                                     
 86. See WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 1(1) (providing that the WTO 
dispute resolution system only applies to “the agreements listed in Appendix 1” 
to Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement). 
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substantive rights and obligations and determine the possible 
grounds for action.87 Thus, the Cyber Treaty will have to provide 
the causes of action that the tribunal will ultimately hear.  
The Cyber Treaty may include existing agreements, such as 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. However, such agreements contemplate disputes outside 
of the cyber realm, and the Cyber Treaty should be narrowly 
tailored to address cyber issues. Broader still is the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, which will exercise jurisdiction on 
any matter referred to it concerning “the interpretation of a 
treaty;” “any question of international law;” “the existence of any 
fact which, if established, would be a breach of international 
obligation;” and “the nature or extent of reparations to be made 
for the breach of an international obligation.”88 Although this 
section covers civil jurisdiction, analogous international treaties 
for civil matters are too broad for the Cyber Treaty’s purposes, 
and thus it is better to examine the jurisdiction method of the 
ICC. 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute establishes the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. It states that the court’s 
jurisdiction is limited to “the most serious crimes,” and then 
enumerates the four crimes as: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.89 The 
subsequent Articles, six through eight, lay out the definitions and 
elements of the first three crimes.90 The Cyber Treaty should 
exercise such precision in its jurisdiction over both civil and 
criminal matters. For the purposes of this section, such civil 
offenses should be drawn around specified actions. Though 
discussed later, the civil actions should include the cyber-theft of 
trade secrets, cyber-espionage of intellectual property, cyber-
espionage of information for economic advantage, and identity 
theft with intent to gain economic advantage. 
                                                                                                     
 87. See id. app. 1 (providing that the covered agreements are the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO and various multilateral and plurilateral 
trade agreements). 
 88. ICJ Statute, art. 36(2). 
 89. Rome Statute, art. 5. 
 90. See id. art. 6–8 (defining the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes). 
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(b) Criminal Jurisdiction 
Article 1 of the Rome Statute invests the ICC with “the 
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern, as referred to in th[e] Statute, 
and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”91 
This co-linear jurisdiction works perfectly for the Cyber Treaty, 
particularly given the court’s limited powers to function as a 
court that conducts probable cause hearings to determine 
extradition for specific crimes. The specific crimes, detailed in a 
subsequent section, should include crimes specifically written 
into the Cyber Treaty and domestic criminal offenses that are 
unanimously adopted by the three member nations and 
incorporated by reference into the treaty.  
As with the ICC, the Cyber Treaty tribunal should acquire 
jurisdiction through referral by a member party.92 Jurisdiction of 
the Cyber Treaty tribunal diverges from ICC jurisdiction at this 
point. The ICC has its own Prosecutor,93 while prosecution under 
the Cyber Treaty shall be handled by the member nation’s 
jurisdiction wherein the victims reside. As explained previously, 
the Attorney General (or equivalent) must refer the charging 
document to the tribunal.94 Once extradition has been granted 
upon probable cause the nation that indicted the defendant will 
try the case. The criminal jurisdiction of the court is therefore 
limited in scope—probable cause and extradition—and 
temporary, lasting only from referral of the charging document 
until extradition has been accomplished through the transfer of 
custody. 
Once the procedural matters for the operation of the tribunal 
have been established, the negotiators can address the 
substantive and procedural laws the court will follow. The next 
subpart discusses a framework for substantive laws. 
                                                                                                     
 91. Id. art. 1. 
 92. See id. art. 13(a) (allowing the court jurisdiction through referral to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC by a member nation).  
 93. See id. art. 15 (prescribing the role and responsibilities of the 
Prosecutor). 
 94. See infra Part III.B.1.b(1)(b) (proposing procedures for extraditing 
individual defendants for prosecution in the victim-nation). 
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C. Substantive and Procedural Laws 
The Cyber Treaty should provide for carefully drafted laws to 
clearly articulate the substantive crimes and procedural rules to 
be followed by the tribunal. That drafting is beyond the scope of 
this Article. However, this Article does provide a conceptual 
framework for crafting such laws. The following sections 
prioritize the considerations for the drafters, beginning with the 
substantive laws. 
1. Assets to Be Protected 
Hackers commit sophisticated cyber-attacks for two reasons: 
to steal information or to disrupt services. Nations should 
therefore identify what assets they seek to protect under the 
Cyber Treaty, and from that point work backward to circumscribe 
which acts may be committed by which actors. Using this 
framework will allow for the narrow tailoring of laws to precisely 
achieve the desired goals. 
The two most prized assets subject to cyber-attack are 
critical infrastructure systems and intellectual property, 
particularly trade secrets and research to be patented. The goals 
of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure are primarily 
disruption of service and gathering intelligence. Critical 
infrastructure systems95 often have a cyber-backbone. Energy 
production is often operated and monitored by supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems that rely upon properly operating 
computers and network connections. Banking systems rely upon 
the security of online login credentials and the storage of 
transactions and account balances. Though the functions of these 
two types of infrastructure are entirely different, their 
commonality is that they allow for the day-to-day living of the 
                                                                                                     
 95. Critical infrastructure systems include power grids and their operating 
systems, water distribution centers, transportation systems, financial systems, 
etc. See Critical Infrastructure, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Critical_infrastructure (last visited July 29, 2014) (describing “assets that are 
essential for the functioning of a society and economy” and regional critical 
infrastructure protection programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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civilian population. A disruption of electricity service, or locking 
people out of the financial system, can grind economic activity to 
a halt, which can paralyze a nation.96 
International law purports to protect civilians from military 
attack.97 This protection specifically includes acts that have a 
“primary purpose of . . . spread[ing] terror among the civilian 
population.”98 This guideline should be analogized to prohibit 
using cyber-attacks to shutdown of the operation of critical 
infrastructure that provides services to a civilian population.  
Cyber-thieves frequently target private businesses to steal 
intellectual property. Much of the value of intellectual property is 
in the exclusivity of knowledge by the owner. Once the exclusivity 
is lost, competitors can use that knowledge to produce the same 
items for significantly less cost, eroding the profits of the 
inventor. The United States—and most of the American states—
has laws protecting trade secrets.99 The unfortunate reality is 
that many developing nations rely on economic espionage to 
bolster their economic growth,100 and once exclusivity of 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Jason Richards, Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its 
Implications for U.S. National Security, 18 G.W. INT’L AFF. REV. (2009), 
available at http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65 (noting that a “sustained attack” on 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems that “run much of U.S. 
[critical infrastructure], including those sectors that regulate water and 
electricity distribution, and mass transit” could “bring about disastrous 
consequences for the quality of American life”). 
 97. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 
June 1977, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1] (providing that the 
“civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against dangers arising from military operations”). 
 98.  Id. art. 51(2). 
 99. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2014) (criminalizing the intentional conversion of 
a trade secret for “the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof,” 
and with the intent or knowledge that the act will “injure any owner of that 
trade secret”). Forty-eight states have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
Bradley E. Chambers, Texas Joins 47 Other States to Adopt the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, BAKER DONELSON (May 30, 2013), 
http://www.bakerdonelson.com/texas-joins-47-other-states-to-adopt-the-uniform-
trade-secrets-act-05-30-2013/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 100. See James Surowiecki, Spy vs. Spy, THE NEW YORKER (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/09/spy-vs-spy-3 (last visited Aug. 
6, 2014) (noting that “engaging in economic espionage is something developing 
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intellectual property is lost it is generally lost for all time. The 
legal interest in this treaty is reduction, not elimination, of 
economic espionage. The threat of a civil cause of action to 
provide compensation to the victims, and extradition to resolve 
criminal charges against the perpetrators, should deter some 
cyber-thieves.  
2. Prohibited Acts 
The Cyber Treaty should break down prohibited acts into 
three groups, allowing for a degree of overlap. The classifications 
are cybercrimes, cyber-espionage, and cyber-warfare. 
Cybercrimes should focus on acts directed at individuals and 
interrupting transactions for businesses. Cybercrimes would 
include the theft of login credentials in furtherance of larceny, 
theft of payment card information, denial of service attacks aimed 
at commercial websites, and the like. Losses should be 
aggregated to promote judicial economy. The rationale for the 
prosecution of cybercrime is to prevent large-scale capital outflow 
and lost profits. 
Cyber-espionage is the middle ground bridging cybercrime 
and cyber-warfare. Cyber-espionage has a similar economic 
motive to cybercrime, but is tied into the theft of intellectual 
property, and when completed, causes massive financial losses. It 
may also serve as the precursor to cyber-warfare: for instance, 
mapping a power grid and planting logic bombs in the event of 
launching a cyber-attack. The Cyber Treaty must differentiate 
between the valid role of cyber-espionage for intelligence 
agencies—gathering intelligence—and acts that can harm 
civilians. 
Cyber-warfare may be the most critical section to negotiate. 
The rules should specifically delineate what cyber-attacks 
military cyber-units may carry out and against whom. The intent 
of this section of the treaty should be nothing less than to civilize 
                                                                                                     
countries do. When you’re not yet generating a lot of intellectual property on 
your own, you imitate”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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cyber-warfare through the protection of civilian populations while 
still recognizing the proper military uses of these tactics. 
3. Actors 
Cyber-attackers can fall into one of three groups: citizens, 
military, and “paramilitary,” meaning private citizens working 
under the direction of the military. The goal of the Cyber Treaty 
should be to maintain order in hacking by way of discouraging 
citizen hackers from committing acts that bring about serious 
detrimental consequences. This goal can be achieved by 
squeezing from two directions. First, military cyber-units should 
be given more latitude to commit acts, since chains of command 
and state sponsorship bring oversight and responsibility to 
actions. Second, military members could be given extraterritorial 
immunity from treaty violations under certain circumstances,101 
while civilian hackers could face both civil damages and criminal 
extradition. The aspirational goal is to deter citizen hackers from 
attacking the networks of other member nations in violation of 
the treaty by providing a punishment mechanism. 
4. Procedure: Attribution 
The single most difficult element of an offense to prove in a 
cybercrime will always be attribution. Attribution relies heavily 
on circumstantial evidence, much of which, though scientific, can 
be called into doubt through the actions of the attackers.102 The 
Cyber Treaty must allow for the admission of circumstantial 
evidence to substantiate attribution, and should set a legal 
standard of “clear and convincing evidence” to satisfactorily 
attribute an attack to an individual or group. 
                                                                                                     
 101. Cyber-attacks that cause civilian death would be an example of 
something that could not carry immunity. 
 102. Hackers seek to mask the IP addresses through techniques like 
hopping. See MANDIANT, supra note 7, at 39–42 (explaining how hackers can 
“bounce or ‘hop’ through intermediary systems such that they almost never 
connect to a victim network directly from their systems”). 
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The Cyber Treaty drafters will have to work with 
corporations and intelligence agencies to understand attacks and 
their consequences. From that point they can move toward 
assigning obligations and responsibilities, and proscribing 
actions, to bring about the goals addressed at the outset of this 
Part. 
IV. Conclusion 
The concept of linkage in international relations means that 
statesmen find relationships in different issues to reinforce each 
other by “creat[ing] a network of incentives and penalties to 
produce the most favorable outcome.”103 Put more simply, linkage 
is finding a way to use progress made in one area to build toward 
progress in an ultimate area.  
This Article has taken a successful Cold War theory, 
triangulation, and applied it to the first link in the diplomatic 
chain, cyber-attacks. The United States needs to prevent 
economic losses from cybercrimes for its own economic health, but 
Russia and China need a strong United States for their own 
economic health and internal stability. The United States can 
pursue its national interests—a stronger economy and reduced 
cyber-attacks—by incentivizing Russia and China to pursue their 
own national interests in stronger economies. By triangulating 
the two nations, the United States will move each nation closer to 
it, producing the desired results. More importantly, the 
negotiating points to bring about the Cyber Treaty will link the 
goals of each nation with each other. Knowing that ultimately 
cyber-attacks are as economically motivated as investment 
treaties and export contracts, negotiating the Cyber Treaty will 
allow for progress to wind down the U.S.–China trade war, and 
may free Russia to expand energy exports in ways that do not 
involve external regime change.  
The current posture of bilateral talks has failed, and the 
parties are advancing towards economic bellicosity. Cooler heads 
                                                                                                     
 103. KISSINGER, supra note 21, at 717. 
106 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2014) 
must prevail. The successful conclusion of this Cyber Treaty will 
be the prevailing force. 
